

# Where Norms Come From

## A Naturalistic Approach

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## The Natural Order vs. The Normative Order

In the Natural Order *Things Happen*:

1. In accordance with laws
2. That brook no disobedience

Qualifications:

- higher level laws are typically *ceteris paribus* laws so do brook disobedience
- deep metaphysics: are the laws (metaphysically) prior to the happenings or the happenings prior to the laws?

## In the Normative Order

- Normative laws/principles/rules/standards etc. “ govern” what *ought to happen, obtain, be done*.
- What *does happen*  $\neq$  what *ought to happen*
- *conceivable* and *really possible*: what *does* happen, *ought not* to have happened; what *ought* to happen *fails* to happen.
  - $\neg(\text{ought/good} \Rightarrow \text{does}) \ \& \ \neg(\text{does} \Rightarrow \text{ought/good})$

## Normative Status and Rational Criticism

- *Normative talk/practice* supports *rational criticism*.
  - when what happens, ought not to have happened, or when what ought to happen, does not happen.
  - Rationally criticizing  $\neq$  causally explaining
  - rational criticism is licensed by *normative status* and the *norms* by which one is *bound*.

## Examples of Normative Statuses

- Being Bankrupt/having paid one's debts.
- Being guilty/innocent in the eyes of the law
- Having a failing/passing grade
- Being rational, irrational, virtuous, vicious.
- *Believing that/knowing that* snow is white (?)

## Normative Status defined by

- a set of (normative or non-normative) “entry conditions:”  
if  $\varphi_1 \dots \varphi_n$ , then x is bankrupt
- a set of downstream “consequences”
  - may be characterized in terms of a set of “entitlements and commitments”
  - If x is bankrupt, creditors enjoy entitlements ... w.r.t. x;  
x is committed ... w.r.t. creditors
- pairing of input/ output conditions is partly determined by the social function role/fine structure of the relevant norm or family of norms.

## Gross Structure vs Fine Structures

- Norms come in several species: epistemic, ethical, linguistic, logical/inferential, aesthetic.
- Species distinguished by their subject matter and their role in achieving social coordination
  - Determines the *fine structure* of the relevant norm/normative family.
- But many norms share a certain *gross structure*.
- Investigation of gross structure of normativity propaedeutic to investigation of the diverse fine-structures of normativity

## A Strategy for Naturalizing Norms?

- laws GOVERN happenings :: norms GOVERN ought-to's
  - No! The governing conception of law is metaphysically queer.
  - No! Norms constitutively tied to rational self-management and a metaphysically queer governing relation is unfit for role in rational self-management
  - No! Normative governance requires no such thing



## Supposed Mistakes of Naturalism

- *analyze normative language* in *non-normative* terms.
- *derive ought* from an *is*
- *reduce normative properties* to *non-normative properties*.
- *justify normative claims/propositions* by appeal to *non-normative facts*.
- Answer the *first-personal deliberative question* -- “what ought I ....” from a merely *third-personal descriptive* perspective “humans beings are such that...”

## Things I Do Not Pretend to Do (yet)

- claim to *analytically reduce* normative *language* to non-normative *language*.
- *derive ought* from *is*
- *reduce* normative properties to non-normative properties.
- *Substitute* a merely descriptive/explanatory stance for a deliberative stance

## Discharging the Naturalist Burden (for now)

- Suffices (for now) if normative properties can be shown to *strongly supervene* on non-normative properties
- In particular: normative properties strongly supervene on human psychology and social organization.
- When the complete theory of nature is in, stronger burdens *may be* dischargeable

## More Explanatory Ambitions

- locate the *justificatory question* as a question *within* a social and psychofunctionalist framework.
- Give a psychological/social/historical account of *what we are doing* when we ask and answer the justificatory question
  - Claim: to ask the justificatory question of oneself and/or others is to make a move within *the dialectic of ratification*
  - dialectic of ratification = *a phenomenon in the natural (and social) worlds*, peculiar, on this planet, to human beings *explicable from within a naturalistic framework*

## What Naturalism will *never* do

- Naturalism will *never* provide *ultimate foundation* of the dialectic of ratification.
- Naturalism will *never undermine* the dialectic of ratification.
- BECAUSE: The dialectic *stands in no need of an ultimate foundation or justification*

## How to Hume a Kant

- Exploit role of norms in rational self-management (with a bow to Kant)
- Show that the metaphysics of rational self-management requires nothing metaphysically queer. (with a bow to Hume)
- The will and intellect have roughly Kantian structures
- Contra Kant, these structures best understood in purely psychologicistic/naturalistic terms.
- Must abandon the Kantian transcendental projects.

## Central Positive Claims

- Humans beings have the *psychological capacity to bind* themselves to norms.
- The *workings* of this capacity can be characterized in entirely *non-normative terms*.
- In particular, in *psychofunctional* terms.
- The capacity for normativity is *plausibly* part of our evolved species typical mental architecture.

## Human Social Life as Normative Community

- $X$  and  $Y$  stand in normative community just in case there exists a set of norms/normative statuses that are *mutually ratified* by  $X$  and  $Y$
- Agents standing in normative community are bound by a system of *reciprocal and reciprocally owned* obligations and commitments.
- Normative community is *distinctively human* form of social life.
  - Psychological capacity for normativity is a condition on the possibility of normative community.



## Evolutionary Time and the Capacity for Normativity.

- In *evolutionary time*, humans arrayed in n.c. of narrow scope.
  - normative communities conferred reproductively impactful advantages *collectively*
  - The capacity for normative community plausibly emerged as adaptive solutions to a set of *coordination problems*.
  - Evolving a capacity for normativity one way among others -- the distinctively human way -- in which those problems were solved over evolutionary time.

# Growth and Decay of Community over Historical Time

- Over *historical time*:
  - humans have formed normative communities of *nonmonotonically increasing* scope and complexity.
- Normative communities of broad scope and complexity are:
  - *rationally optional*
  - *Historically contingent*
  - *culturally specific achievements*
- Universal Normative community:
  - a *culturally specific project* of liberal modernity, not yet a *concrete achievement* of the human community at large.

## Toward a PsychoFunctionalism of Normativity

### *Reflectively owned Norms*

- a cognizing agent *C* *reflectively owns a norm N* if *C* would, upon *culminated competent reflection*, *endorse N*.

The *binding force* of a reflectively owned norm:

- rooted in that cognizer's own *conception of the good* and *culminated competent reflective endorsements* grounded in such conceptions.

Reflectively owned norms are *sources of reasons* that count as the owning cognizing-agent's *own reasons*

## Being *Bound* by a Norm vs Being *Held* to a Norm

- A cognizer is *bound* by all and only those norms that *she herself* would endorse upon *culminated competent reflection*
  
- A cognizer may be *held* by others to norms to which she is not bound.
  - A norm *N* that *A* endorses, may give *A* a reason to *hold B* to *N*, even if *B* would not endorse *N* upon culminated competent reflection
  
  - *A*'s having a reason to hold *B* to *N* does not ipso facto give *B* a non-derivative reason to live up to *N*.

## Two-Species of Entitlement

- *Self-generated* entitlement:  $x$  entitles herself to hold  $y$  to  $N$ 
  - $x$ 's self-generated entitlement to hold  $y$  to  $N$  cannot *bind*  $y$  to  $N$
- *Other-granted* entitlement:  $y$  entitles  $x$  to hold  $y$  to  $N$ 
  - Even if  $y$  has bound herself to  $N$ , it does not follow that  $y$  ipso facto *grants* entitlement  $x$ , for arbitrary  $x$  to hold  $y$  to  $N$ .

## My Reasons, Your Reasons, Shared Reasons

- *My reasons:* correlative with *the set of norms to which I am bound*
- *Your reasons:* correlative with *the set of norms to which you are bound*
- My having my reasons need not be reason-giving for you; You having your reasons need not be reason-giving for me.
- But *shared reasons* are *possible*.

## Conceptions of the good

a conception of the good:

- a set of initial (or initiating) convictions and commitments (of whatever strength or intensity) about what is to be, be done, or be believed.
- initial inputs to reflection
- Conceptions of the good may be more or less articulate, fixed, determinate, coherent or incoherent
- The having of commitments and convictions is characteristic of *reflective cognizing agency*

## Commitment contrasted with Desire

- Commitments can endure, even as desire wanes.
- Commitments are quasi-desiderative/quasi-judgmental attitudes the functional role of which involves:
  - a constitutive tie to reflection
  - a “trumping” role with respect to motivational factors at odds with one’s commitments.



## A Hard Problem

- Can the trumping role of commitment be understood psychofunctionally?
  - Desire may win out *either* by “illegitimately” occupying a causally dominant role or by contributing to the reconfiguration of commitments.
  - Must explain the difference in non-normative merely functional terms.
- HINT: Commitments that still enjoy the agent’s rational backing will(?) or would, upon culminated competent reflection(?), *cause attitudes of regret and shame*
- CAVEAT: The (rational) reconfiguration of commitments in light of incompatible desires remains possible.

## Still More on Commitment and Desire

- Desires are not constitutively tied to reflection.
- Non-reflective being may have desires.
- Some human beings may, as a matter of fact, lack reflective capacity and with it a set of convictions and commitments.
  - Compare: Bratman's Policies and Plans
    - Bratman is more initially concerned with the rational management of a single cognizing agent over time.
    - Goal: understand what psychological capacities make any agent *a suitable candidate for participation in normative community*.

## Endorsement

- Endorsements are *the outputs* of reflection.
- a state  $x$  is an endorsement if it is a state of a kind  $K$  such that:
  - culminated courses of reflection typically *culminate* in states of kind  $K$
  - states of kind  $K$  typically cause pro-attitudes toward appropriate actions, attitudes and/or states of affairs

## Endorsements and Binding Force

- Endorsements express an agent's "reflective ownership" of commitments.
- reflectively owning a norm amounts to undertaking responsibility for *rational self-management* in accordance with that norm.
  - One is thereby responsible to oneself and to those with whom one stands in rational community
- one endows oneself with a *normative status* that *commits* one to *manage* claims, beliefs, intentions, desires in ways that both accord with that norm and that *entitle others*, with whom one stands in *normative community*, to *hold* one to that norm.

## Self-Management → Responsiveness to Rational Pressures

- Pressures for Coherence/Consistency
  - *Self-generated* rational pressures, flowing from one's own commitments, desires, beliefs, etc.
- Dialectical rational Pressures:
  - *Rational pressures directed me-ward* from other rational sources in the form of rational arguments, criticisms, demands for justification, etc.
- Evidential Pressures
  - Pressures generated by one's attempts to regulate one's beliefs and other cognitive states in accordance with the evidence.

## Competence: A Selectionist Account

- Exercises of a reflective capacity of a certain psychofunctional character played historically a decisive causal role in spreading and sustaining normative community
- *Current exercises* of the *same reflective capacity* count as episodes of *competent* reflection
- CAVEAT: *intellectual progress* may produce *refined forms of reflection*
  - If so, the competence condition for *C* will specify that refined form of reflection that *currently* plays the decisive causal role in sustaining and spreading normative community in *C*

## Competence is not an inescapably normative notion

- The question is not which form of reflection objectively “deserves” to play a decisive causal role in the spread of normative community
- What kind of reflection has in fact in evolutionary and/or historical time played the decisive role in spreading and sustaining normative community among some collection of cognizing-agents?
- The competence condition specifies merely “how it has been/is done hereabouts.”

## The Multiplicity of Dialectical Cohorts

- *A Dialectical Cohort:* a collection of agents in which a given form of reflection functions to sustain normative community.
- There may be a multiplicity of dialectical cohorts
- A given agent may be a member of many dialectical cohorts simultaneously.
- An agent may be or become a dialectical cohort of one.
- Intellectual progress may happen when old dialectical cohorts “fragment” and new ones are reconstituted around new forms of reflection.



## Culmination

- a course of reflection *culminates* when:
  - given all currently dialectically relevant considerations
  - a fixed conception of the good
  - further reflection on those same inputs to reflection would lead to the same endorsement.
- Reflection *culminates* when it produces endorsements that are *stable under further reflection*, given only the currently relevant inputs to reflection and a fixed conception of the good.

## Caveats and Refinements

- the stability that characterizes culmination is a *merely local stability*.
  - further reflection may yield different endorsements when *new inputs* are available or even when a *new weights* are assigned to old inputs because of a change in the agent's conception of the good.
- Culmination is not a matter of *objectively justified* stopping points.
  - culmination is only a matter of a commitment having the agents "full rational backing."
  - culminated reflection determines *where the agent in fact stands* with respect to the distribution of reasons
  - It does so by determining which of the *would-be reasons* are *genuine reasons* for the relevant agent.

## The Counterfactuals do the Hard Work

- An agent has a *reflection-determining psychology* just in case:
  - There are true counterfactuals
  - about what norms the agent *would* endorse upon culminated competent reflection.
  - these counterfactuals are made true by *the current actual structure and content* of the agent's will and/or intellect
- A reflection determining psychology:
  - *tacitly binds* an agent to certain norms
  - may *entitle others* to subject her to rational criticism even in the absence of her explicit occurrent endorsement of the relevant norms.

## Tacit vs Explicit Binding

- Tacit binding is not a full bore undertaking of responsibility for rational self-management
- But tacit binding functions to license rational criticism.
- As such tacit binding plays a social-dialectical role.
- When others self-generate entitlements to hold me to norms to which I am tacitly bound their entitlements may be “rooted” in facts about the psychological structure of my normative lights

## Psychology need not be Reflection Determining

- incoherent, unstable or indeterminate conceptions of the good may produce unstable, incoherent or indeterminate endorsements.
- In such cases, there are no determinate facts about counterfactual reflective endorsements and so no determinate facts about the agent's reasons.
  - Reflection, if engaged in, may sometimes culminate in a *de novo* act of ownership and self-constitution, not fully determined by the agent's antecedent psychological make up.
  - Such reflection does not elucidate reasons that were there but unacknowledged, but produces reasons where there were not yet any.
- Elucidative vs Sartrean Reflection

## Normative Community through Rational Solidarity

A norm is *mutually ratified* by a community if:

- a) the members of the community *share norms* in the sense that they *one and all* endorse or would endorse the same norms
- b) the members of that community *mutually recognize* that they share norms.
- c) the members of the community *endorse one another's endorsing* of the norms that they mutually recognize that they share.

## Mutually Ratified Norms Transmit Original Reasons

- Through mediation of mutually ratified norms of inquiry and communication directing the truth to be sought and told *my* having a reason for believing that  $\phi$  may give *you* an *original non-derivative* reason, for believing that  $\phi$  as well.
- Through the mediation of mutually ratified norms of conduct calling for mutual aid and co-operation, my having a reasons for  $\phi$ 'ing may give you an original, non-derivative reason either to refrain from interfering with my attempts to  $\phi$  or to aid me in  $\phi$ 'ing
- Mutually ratified norms are the rails along which original reasons are transmitted from cognizing agent to cognizing agent.

## Two Ratification Problems

- the *self-ratification* problem
  - A cognizing agent's beliefs and desires present themselves to that very cognizing agent as candidates for her own reflective endorsement.
  - Through reflective endorsement, those beliefs and desires are made truly her own
  - those beliefs and desires, as well as the sources of those beliefs and desires, are thereby promoted into reasons and rational sources *for her*.



## Ratification by Others

- A norm/space of reasons that I have constituted as merely my own is not ipso facto guaranteed to be ratified by others
  - Even so, I may self-generate an entitlement to *hold* others to norms *to which they are not bound*.
  - My self-generated entitlement may (or may not be) *ratified* by the other with a *granted entitlement* to hold her to the relevant norm.
  - When another ratifies my self-generated entitlement, she has, in effect, “owned” my normativity authority as a normative authority for herself as well.

## Conceptually Distinct but Practically Enmeshed

- The problem of self-ratification and the problem of other-ratification are *conceptually distinct*
- *In practice* self-ratification typically is enmeshed with:
  - my ratification (or non-ratification) of rational demands flowing me-ward from others
  - the ratification (or non-ratification) by others of rational demands flowing outward from me.
- This *push and pull of reasons* is what sets the very problem of rational community.

## Two Unresolved Questions

- What are the “me-ward” and the “me-from?”
- Is the self “inherently” social or is the social constituted via selves that are not yet (humanly) social?

## Possible Answers

- Human sociality sits on top of the great chain of mere animal sociality.
  - Compare Ants, chimps, and humans.
- Human sociality first emerges through the interaction of *animal sociality* with *individual representational and normative capacities* resident in minds *not yet humanly social*.
- The emergence of distinctively human reflective, recognitional and representational capacities *first makes possible* a problem to which human sociality is a solution.

## The Dialectic of Ratification begins with Recognition

- A fully reflective in tact rational being, recognizes herself as an *original* source of reasons *for herself*.
  - This is a form of “self-valuing”
- To recognize that another is a fellow rational being is to recognize that other as an original source of reasons for herself.
  - This amounts to recognition that the other values herself as I value myself.

## Recognition vs Solidarity

- Recognition is not yet the achievement of rational solidarity because:
  - Because recognizing the other as a self-valuing agent is not yet to value the other as “another self” for oneself.
- This applies also to cognition:
  - To recognize another as another rational cognizer is not yet to recognize her cognizing as “cognizing for oneself.”
  - “Owning” another’s cognizing as cognizing “for oneself” makes possible cooperative forms of inquiry such as science and “knowledge” through testimony.

## Mere Instruments vs. Another Self-Valuing Self

- Recognition that another self-values already makes her more than a *mere instrument*
  - mere instruments are not anything *to or for* themselves.
  - As such they are not even *potentially* valued as *another self*
  - By contrast, *other self-valuing agents* are at least potentially valued by us as other selves, as other selves *for ourselves* and not merely as selves *for themselves*.
  - Hence we may distinguish within the class of *derivative* rational sources *mere instruments* from *self-valuing others*

## Recognition and the Ratification Question

- Recognition of the self-valuing rational nature of another may put the question:
  - What, if anything, shall we do, be or believe together as fellow rational beings?
  - Thereby, setting *the problem of mutual ratification*
- The problem of mutual ratification is addressed though *the dialectic of ratification*.
  - This dialectic may culminate in either *rational solidarity* OR *rational enmity*.



## What Rational Solidarity Achieves

- Rational solidarity involves agents both making it the case and making it mutually manifest that it is the case that each is an original normative authority and a non-derivative source of reasons for the other.
- It amounts to the mutual constitution of a *community of reasons* and the mutual acknowledgement of one another as *equal partners* in that community.
- Contra Kant, the community of reasons is *not* an a priori rationally mandatory, imperative categorically binding on all rational beings as such.
- Arguably, it is not even inevitable outgrowth of the growth and decay of human culture or the progress of human history.

## The Possibility of Rational Enmity

- *Rational enmity*
  - In rational enmity there reigns a *discord of reasons*
  - X and Y stand in rational enmity if X entitles herself to hold Y to norms abhorrent to Y (and/or vice versa).
  - When X and Y stand in rational enmity, neither owns the other as an original rational source
  - Rational enmity is possible because my norms may entitle me to hold another, perhaps through force and coercion, to norms abhorrent to the other, while the other entitle herself to resist the holding, perhaps with force and coercion of her own.

## On the “Universality” of Morality

- An oft attempted dismissal of moral relativism:

“Standards that varied from one speaker or agent to another simply wouldn't be moral standards; they would be cultural norms or personal preferences, not standards of right and wrong.” (DV L2R)

## How to be a Relativist

- *Tolerant relativism*: there can be *no* self-generated entitlement to hold another to norms to which she is not bound.
- *Intolerant relativism*: there *can be* self-generated entitlements to hold another to norms to which she is not bound.
- “Felt universality” of morality consistent with I.R, but not T.R.
- I. R. → we may rationally endorse some norms as *norms for entire (rational) order*.
- And thereby self-generate entitlement to hold the entire rational order to N.
- BUT: my self-generated entitlement cannot bind the entire rational order to N.

## Reproblematizing Normative History

*If* thoroughgoing rational enmity is a:

- *rationally permissible*
- *conceivable*
- *and really historically possible*

culmination point in the space of possible culminations for human history and culture

*then* the *fact* that human history has tended haltingly toward ever more inclusive rational community deserves to be re-problematized

# Rational Powers, Rational Content, And Incommensurability

Some Davidsonian Claims:

It is a condition of the very possibility of cognizing another as a thinker at all that the interpreter view the interpreted as by and large rational

The interpreter must cognize the beliefs of the interpreted as by and large true and by and large rational

The very possibility of “incommensurable” conceptual schemes is ruled out partly on the grounds that rationality can only be *rationality by our own lights*.

Together with the slingshot, the argument against incommensurability is supposed to undermine the very idea of a conceptual scheme (and with it the scheme/content duality)

## A Worry Prompted by Davidson

- Davidson's argument seems to imply that *thoroughgoing* rational enmity is not really possible, even if it is (barely) conceivable.
- If Davidson is right, then in order merely to recognize another as rational agent, I must already stand in some degree of rational community with her.
- At a minimum we must be members of the same dialectical cohort.
- “Local” outbreaks of “rational enmity” may still be possible.

## A Partial Possible Rejoinder to Davidson

- Distinguish *recognizing that another has rational powers* from *endorsing* another's rational contents *as rational contents for oneself*
  - Rational contents are contents of states occurrences of which constitute exercises of rational powers.
  - To recognize that another has rational powers is to recognize that some of her content bearing states are bound up with exercises of her rational powers.



## How Incommensurability *Might* be Possible

- Suppose it were possible that:
  - I *recognize that* another has rational powers
  - I *barely entertain* the contents of her states
  - I recognize that the relevant thought episodes , with the entertained contents, involve *the exercise of her rational powers*.
  - YET I also recognize that the entertained contents are *not possible rational contents for me*

## Recognition of a Content as Bare Entertaining

- Recognizing the content's of another's states requires only that it be possible for me to *barely entertain* those contents.
- In *barely entertaining* a content one undertakes no substantive doxastic, epistemic or evaluative *commitment of one's own* to that content.
- Contents that are barely entertained are not yet believed, not yet desired, not yet hoped for.
- Bare entertaining is a quasi-quotational attitude.
- Think of contents whose constituent concepts, though unproblematic taken severally, cannot be coherently combined.

## Ascription and Bare Entertaining

- In *ascribing a content to another*, it can be *rational for me* to *barely entertain* that content, even if it is not rational for me to undertake any *positive* doxastic, epistemic, or evaluative commitment to it.
- One can also ascribe unendorsable doxastic commitments to another via the mechanism of what I elsewhere call *fulsomenly de re ascriptions*
- Fulsoemly de re ascriptions do not even require that one even barely entertain the problematic contents.

## The Important Grain of Truth in Davidson's Argument

- Cognition of another as a *candidate* for normative community presupposes that one cognizes the contents of the other's thoughts as possible contents for one's own rational states.
- Consequently in barely entertaining another's thought contents, I do not thereby cognize the other as a candidate for rational/normative community

## The Space between Entertaining and Endorsement

- There is space between the bare entertaining, necessary for the mere ascription of a content and the cognition of a content as candidate contents for one's own rational states.
- Incommensurability is made possible by the existence of this space.
- Incommensurability = the cognition of the absence of the possibility of normative community with what one recognizes, nonetheless, as another rational being
- This requires that one be able to rationally but barely entertain contents, paradigmatically in the context of ascription, to which one cannot rationally undertake a positive doxastic commitment of one's own

## Shared Concepts, Unshared Thoughts

- Plausibly, barely entertaining a content requires that one possess the concepts that are its constituents
  - This is one way in which bare entertaining differs from mere quotation
  - In barely entertaining a content one puts the content “on display” in an entirely non-committal way
- Cognizers may share concepts, even if they share (no? few?) thoughts involving those concepts.
- Recognition that another’s thoughts are rational by her lights, but not by mine, may presuppose that I at least possess some concepts in common with her.

## Commensurability and Universal Constraints

- There are *universally applicable constraints* on the norms we endorse.
  - Because each fully reflective rational cognizing agent is present to herself as *an original source of reasons*, no rational agent can coherently endorse her own enslavement to another.
    - » That no agent endorses her own servitude, does not imply that no agent endorses the servitude of another
    - » The universality of such constraints does not imply universal normative community.
    - » Incommensurability of norms is still possible even where all are constrained by their own rationality to endorse some norm or other of a certain type.

## Commensurability and Universally Endorsed Norms

- Some norms are plausibly universally (and non-accidentally) endorsed by all rational beings
- Plausibly *logical norms*, rooted in *the general psychological structure* of a rational intellect, are tacitly endorsed by every *fully reflective rational agent*
- *Universal endorsement* of the norms of logic is not yet *rational community*, because *universality* is not yet *mutuality*
- Universality may set the limits of the recognizably rational in the sense that a creature in whom we recognize no tacit endorsement of universally endorsed logical norms may not be recognizably rational
- Such a creature must lack the very structure characteristic of a rational intellect/will



## Thick or Thin Normative Scaffolding?

- The structure of a rational intellect may generate, via the norms of logic, a *thin but encompassing scaffold*, relative to which great normative variability is still possible.
- If *moral* or *epistemic* or *linguistic* norms were, like logic, ultimately rooted in the *general psychological structure* of the rational intellect and/or will, then a *thick normative scaffold* might be directly generated by reason itself.
- But this is doubtful.
- OPEN QUESTION: Does logic itself form a *fixed domain of norms*, settled once and for all, by the very structure of the rational intellect.
- To answer this question, we must interrogate the very idea of “logicality.”